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For over fifty years, antagonistic relations between the United States and Cuba
yielded little beyond a rigid impasse in formal communication channels. During the
Cold War period, the relationship included
a failed armed invasion of Cuba (popularly known as the Bay of Pigs), escalated
tensions between the ideological poles of
the global “East” and “West” bringing the
world to the brink of nuclear disaster (the
Cuban missile crisis), and an intensifying
series of measures by the US government
to reverse the Cuban social and political
revolution in the name of national security
(ranging from economic sanctions to assassination attempts). In the bipolar international system dominating the second half of
the 20th century in which decision-makers
were largely operating under realist powerpolitics assumptions, it is remarkable that
Cuba existed as a rebel small state in the
sphere of influence of a hegemonic power
on whose agenda the country ranked as a
supreme security threat. Proximity adds
another noteworthy dimension: Cuba is 90
miles away from Florida. What accounts
for Cuba’s prolonged “survival” with relatively little impingement on the country’s
ability to self-determine its internal sociopolitical and economic configuration? How
Cuba pulled o↵ the feat is worth noting
(Section II) to contextualize and contrast
Cuba’s present-day challenges in a changed
and changing international landscape.
2015 looks very di↵erent for Cuba
and Cuban-US relations. It is characterized by an increased flexibility in the
United State’s diplomatic stance and an increased willingness of the Cuban Communist Party (PCC) to amend the country’s
socio-economic architecture away from one
dominated by central planning and stateownership. Cuban President Raul Castro,
however, has made it clear that a major

overhaul of the country’s political system
won’t accompany the normalization of USCuban relations. Shortly before 2014 drew
to an end, the president reiterated:
“We can’t pretend that by improving ties with the Unites States, Cuba
will renounce the ideas for which it
has fought for more than a century,
for which its people have shed a lot
of blood and have run the biggest of
risks.” (Mitchell, 2015)
In this context, Cuba is feeling its way
cautiously towards market-socialism. In
2010, Cuba’s trade union (the CTC) published a statement in the PCC’s official
newspaper (the Granma) announcing a series of sweeping changes aimed at raising economic productivity. (Granma, 2010)
The statement repeated points made previously by Raul to the e↵ect that “oversized social spending” has to be reduced
and that “excessive subsidies” and “unwarranted gratuities” had to be eliminated. (Castro, 2010) To this end, the
PCC is introducing new - and expanding its limited existing - legal categories
of domestic private entrepreneurial activity, increasing licenses for self-employment,
and simultaneously downsizing the statesector. (Pérez-Stable, 2010) The party is
also continuing to actively attract targeted
foreign direct investments in sectors including agriculture, infrastructure, sugar,
nickel mining, and real estate development.
Cuban citizens are creatively exploiting the
new breathing room formally and informally allowed by the state. What will
the update to the economic model mean
for the socialist project? Can the social
gains of the revolution supporting community and personal development—from
universal housing, education, and health
care to accessible and vibrant artistic and

25

Isabella Smull

recreational venues—be reconciled with elements of market driven growth? This article will explicate this inevitable tension:
keeping intact the precincts of the revolution while opening the door to capitalist

forces driven by certain inherently opposing tendencies. If not well-managed, the
transition threatens the very social-ills that
the revolution has heretofore averted.

Cuban Survival
The revolution’s early success in resisting
U.S. encroachment hinged on mass mobilization of Cuban nationalism. A deliberate socialization process cultivated a revolutionary consciousness loosely summarized as a belief in one Cuba for all Cubans
by Cubans. The vision was instrumental
in legitimizing the regime internally. By
convincingly presenting itself as the political force championing sovereignty and a
flat distribution of wealth, the Cuban state
derived its legitimacy at home through
an anti-systemic movement that challenged
a neoliberal logic for societal organization. The resulting internal popular support helped mute US e↵orts to fan dissident coals in the countries unyielding
attempts to light destabilizing counterrevolutionary fires. Cuba’s relatively cohesive internal commitment to revolutionary
principles was not only the founding basis of the PCC’s Cuba, but it conferred to
the country credibility that it was a promoter of its espoused principles. As such,
the Cuban socialist model became recognized as a viable and visionary one by
other states and movements in the international community involved in liberation
struggles against Western impingements on
sovereignty and self-determination. A genuine collective revolutionary consciousness,
therefore, was also instrumental for garnering external recognition. Cuba had a
clear global vision, and the vision was recognized as a competitive one in the international order, and the recognition, in turn,
translated into material benefits indispensable to maintaining power. In Cuba’s case,
this meant preferential trade agreements
with Russia and full integration into the
Soviet trade orbit. The relationship secured a market for Cuba’s primary ex-

port - sugar - at subsidized prices along
with subsidized inflows of Russian industrial goods, foods, medicine, weapons, and
oil that Cuba could use domestically as well
as mark-up and resell on global markets
for profit. This economic integration diluted the strangulation e↵ect of U.S sanctions that had proven crippling in countries like Nicaragua and Chile. It was precisely because Cuba was recognized as an
actor worth backing that a better-endowed
benefactor did, in fact, back it. The result was a Cuba able to secure enough
material wherewithal to deliver on its socialist promise. This minimized the discrepancy between the PCC’s revolutionary rhetoric and its ability to deliver – a
costly discrepancy that might have arisen
had the party not been able to finance the
social programs at the heart of the socialist project. What would happen when the
better-endowed benefactor was no longer
so well endowed?
In 1991, Gorbachev announced that the
Soviet Union would end the 4-5 billion dollar annual subsidy to the Cuban economy
and withdraw troops and advisors from the
island. The dissolution of the Soviet Union
also meant the collapse of its sponsored
trading bloc. Cuba’s economic juggernaut
was severely injured virtually overnight: no
more preferential prices, no more delivery
of critical resources (oil, food, medicine),
and no more guaranteed markets for Cuban
sugar to finance domestic government expenditures. During the period between
1990 and 1993, Cuba lost over 80 percent
of its foreign trade, and its GDP plummeted by 30 percent. (Mesa-Lago, 1998)
In an apparent e↵ort to capitalize on the
ensuing Cuban desperation, in hopes that
critical conditions might force the PCC
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into making political and economic concessions, the U.S passed The Cuban Democracy Act in 1992 and the Helms-Burton
Act in 1996. The acts intensified e↵orts
to isolate the Cuban economy and coax its
implosion by deterring the FDI Cuba was
desperately trying to attract and by cutting into its remittance hard-currency revenue. (Kornbluh & LeoGrande, 2014) The
economic strangulation came with a manipulative peace o↵ering: sanctions would
be lifted if Cuba democratized.
Energy shortages and food shortages
became commonplace, along with malnutrition and the deterioration of infrastructure. Despite this, Cuba once again resisted external dictates and reoriented to
adapt to the loss of Soviet subsidies and US
pressure. The struggles characterizing the
period combined with the PCC’s responses
to assuage them, however, have had repercussions for the relationship between the
state and its citizens: Cubans began losing faith in the ability of the state to meet
their needs and the state began signaling
that perhaps, it too, was losing faith in its
ability to micromanage society sustainably
and e↵ectively. While Cuba “survived”
what became dubbed the “special period,”
it was not without trauma to the Cuban
psyche and the country’s revolutionary socialist framework, validating inklings that
the Cuban model was in need of update.
Before the special period, the Fidel solution to low economic productivity tended
towards “mobilization politics” that rallied
the people behind moral incentives and the
righteousness of the revolution (rectification campaign in the late 80s, Committees
for the Defense of the Revolution, youth
armies to wage a “battle of ideas” in the
early 90s). (Pérez-Stable, 1993) This time,
nationalistic appeals to “la patria” (the fatherland) to maintain consensus over the
status quo would not be enough. Public dissatisfaction over falling living standards produced over fifty dissident groups
during the mid-90s, suggesting that Cuban
citizens were increasingly looking to shape
political and economic processes alterna-
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tive to the existing state structure. (Carriel, 2011) Faced with a severely floundering economy and growing popular discontent, the PCC was pressed to begin structurally amending its economic model. Relative recovery out of the dismal decade has
come on the back of exploiting the country’s competitive advantage in the tourist
sector, decentralizing certain economic activity (notably in food production and distribution), and allowing market incentives
to spur production. Thus, it is in this period that the PCC’s introduction of market mechanisms began Cuba’s transition
towards a more mixed economy.
Adding wind to the sails of change, the
day-to-day difficulties of the special period
are etched into a new collective memory of
Cuban Millennials who did not live through
the revolution. One Cuban student at University of Havana recounts:
“You couldn’t find meat or dairy anywhere. My mom fried the skin of papayas and put them on rice to help us
pretend. Most of our days were spent
looking for food because government
rations weren’t enough. My friends
and I would look at the Havana pier
everyday, and everyday it was empty.
I just wanted to live better—another
way.” (Chaviano, 2015)
While more substantive ethnographic
work is needed to make conclusive statements, it is worth noting that the many
Cubans of this generation I came into contact with rarely wanted to speak of the
past. My questions about the revolution—of its heroes, its principles, its shortcomings and successes—were quickly redirected into fervent e↵orts to highlight a
more nuanced Cuba. They were eager to
show the ways in which they are creatively
pushing the envelope in all social spheres
from tech to art. (Helft, 2015) The message was clear: there is a burgeoning community of Cubans who want to be—and are
already—part of a global community whose
ambitions exceed historic limitations on integration with modernity.

27

Isabella Smull

Moving Forward
The international system of the 21st century is characterized by changes in the distribution of power away from U.S unipolar dominance. It is under revisionist pressures from recognized great power contenders who have organized their political economies di↵erently than the plural
democratic, neo-liberal formula historically
propagated by the U.S. The hegemonic presumption is under attack by rising heavyweights like China, India, and Brazil:
abridging sovereignty to impose internal reconfigurations (militarily and economically
by conditioning loans and trade) is becoming a more costly diplomatic move. In
this context, what it means to “liberalize”
and “democratize” is increasingly understood as a nuanced, context-based concept.
This said, the 21st century world remains
favorable to institutionalized, rule-based,
and capitalist modes for organizing political economies. The security, diplomatic,
and economic benefits conferred to participants and upholders of this order do not
compel radical system overhaul, but incentivize revisionist agendas to operate from
within its bounds. The endurance of liberal
institutional hallmarks—open, rule-based,
and integrated state relations—remain, at
present, enshrined in international institutions, multilateral diplomacy, and free
trade agreements. Conversation regarding
the merits and drawbacks of such configurations aside, enough states have hopped
on the “rule of law and market mechanisms” bandwagon that it can be dubbed
the “common language.” As such, integration into the liberal order may vary in pace
and in terms, but the debate about national choice regarding economic development strategies seems to have shifted: it
is increasingly about varieties of capitalism. (Hall & Soskice, 2001) It is about different usages of market mechanism to fos-

ter growth and di↵erent ways by which to
engage with global markets rather than “to
be or not to be.”
In light of the trajectory of Cuba’s
reforms, has the country’s “resistance”
to integration into the liberal order only
changed the timeline of its inevitable submission? Perhaps. This determinism, however, is not entirely helpful in fashioning
potential Cuban evolutionary trajectories
and the impacts they could have on Cuban
society regarding education, health care,
the spatial and economic bifurcation of society, food security, artistic development,
and so on. Although the “Cuba model” of
the Cold War era finds itself outdated, certain virtuous socialist precedents have been
successfully institutionalized, and many
negative externalities wreaked by the brash
and naive youth of a nascent globalizing capitalist order have been attenuated
thanks to Cuba’s isolation, or insulation,
from the phenomena. This unique evolution could enable Cuba’s development into
a highly socialized democracy that uses
market mechanisms for economic development in a controlled and equitable fashion.
Still, by neoliberal standards, Cuba’s
embrace of the global economy under Raul
Castro’s leadership since 2006 has been
modest, at best. I will progress with informed speculation: What is the driving
logic behind continued limitation on domestic entrepreneurial activity? How much
longer can the PCC control this activity,
and, as it loses some measure of control,
what will it mean for the authority of the
regime? Will the space created by moderate liberalizations embolden and empower
civil society to make demands for more reform? How will the PCC respond to the increasing pressures for inclusion by dissident
interests presenting opposing agendas?

Give them an inch, and they’ll take a mile.
Understanding why the PCC is keeping
careful limits on domestic liberalizations

necessitates exploring both the fallacies
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in a “free-market for optimal social wellbeing” logic and the risks entailed by allowing private capital too much freedom,
too soon.
To understand Cuban fears of the freemarket model, one need not look farther
than the e↵ects of private capital in the
country’s northern neighbor. As the U.S.
makes its way into the 21st century, the
American urban landscape is marked by
an unprecedented degree of spatially and
racially concentrated urban poverty devoid
of a significant industrial sector. Urban
poor remain isolated in degrading locales
that have been milked of financial capital,
industry, and jobs that pay a livable wage.
Briefly, this outcome is explained as follows: Since the onset of the country’s industrialization, the less that private capital
has been subject to an international and
national regulatory regime and the more
that technological innovations have permitted its rapacious mobility, the relationship
between communities, the private sector,
and the political sector has become increasingly imbalanced. The negotiation process over the terms of the relationships between the aforementioned players has increasingly become one where each comes to
the table with predetermined winning and
losing hands. What’s more, the impact of a
“win” and of a “loss” has become ever more
consequential, and there exists a growing
inequality in who bears the brunt of the
losses and who has access to the wins. Absent appropriate regulations, market mechanisms have largely been utilized to maximize profits for the few at the expense of
the public good.
The method behind the outcome: private sector mergers. Monopolistic configurations grant business leverage in the economic, political, and social realms. As
such, the more that control over production and distribution of an industry is consolidated under a singular firm, the more
profit the firm can derive. Economically,
less competition in a market means more
leeway to inflate prices and rake in profits above market value, passing on the cost
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to consumers. Politically, concentrated private control over a vital commodity means
that a firm has substantial economic power
to leverage for political influence: it need
only withhold supply by restricting output
to passively manipulate policy in its favor.
Furthermore, as economic power becomes
more concentrated, the number of important decision-makers shrink. This means
that a decision to divest or relocate capital represents a larger share of the industry and jobs in a community, consequently
a↵ecting a larger share of the residents in
which the industry resides. When labor
becomes dependent on fewer providers of
work, it is put in a subordinated negotiating position absent alternative employment
options. The power dynamic tilts towards
a dependency of labor on capital, disposing
labor to make more and more concessions
just to keep capital—with their livelihood
in hand—from leaving. From the PCC’s
vantage point, centralizing control over the
means of production has meant avoiding
these dynamics that would impinge on an
equitable and stable distribution of goods
and services.
To understand Cuban fears of liberalizing too hastily, we can look broadly
at the struggles that have plagued the
Latin American developmental states subject to speedy neo-liberal reform packages
in the post-WWII era. Social spending
and human capital investment tended to
su↵er while macro-economic growth was
prioritized. In this structure, it was in
the interest of regional elites to cater
to profit-maximizing needs of private entrepreneurs since their own economic and
political power was inextricably bound to
the wealth they amassed or the wealth that
backed them. As such, they did take extreme measures to ease supply and demand
constraints. While some measures were
more benign in nature (supplying credit
to preferred private firms and sectors, privatizing areas of the public sector, etc.),
they just as often included the suppression
of the masses to create a ready supply of
cheap labor. Such phenomena resulted in
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externally oriented economies that overemphasized the export of lucrative monocultures for the consumption of the global core
at the expense of both the production of
food staples for local subsistence and diversified local markets that might root capital
in communities and o↵er labor more negotiating power. Furthermore, the abrupt
nature of the transition to a radically liberal economic model outpaced the development of institutions equipped to manage it,
giving way to a narrow ruling coalition between profit generators and the representatives of state muscle capable of ensuring
those profits. There is no natural firewall
between the economy and politics: Those
who have acquired money from the economic sector can put this money to work in
the political sector. It follows that a natural outcome of too intimate a contact over a
prolonged period between the political and
private sector absent institutional bu↵ers is
a realignment of the political ruling coalition to include a domestic capitalist class.
I suspect that the institutionalization
of a state-private sector relationship is exactly what the PCC wants to avoid. The
party is wary of unbottling entrepreneurial
forces with the understanding that once
let out of the cage, they will be very difficult to re-captivate. An emerging private

sector allows for the private accumulation
of wealth and state-independent ownership
of the country’s means of production. As
such, this sector would not only depend
less and less on the state, but the direction
of dependency would switch: private production would become indispensable to the
health of the macro-economy. Leogrande
notes that as this happens, “their desire
for less government interference is certain
to take a more explicitly political direction.”. (Kornbluh & LeoGrande, 2014) In
other words, a capitalist class will have ample material power to leverage in placing
demands on the government for favorable
business policies that are rarely in line with
equity or distributive justice. Furthermore,
it is likely that demands on the government
by a growing private sector will not stop
at lobbying e↵orts but will escalate into
e↵orts to institutionalize a state-business
alliance to procure preferential treatment
in the long term. If a resilient political
apparatus is not firmly in place to deflect this imposition, the socialist fabric of
Cuba’s revolution will be deeply threatened. The prevalence of pro-domestic, private business policies without proper regulations will be accompanied by some degree
of inequality, placing redistributive socialism on the back burner.

Conclusion
Given that the floodgates have been
opened, the PCC will probably not be able
to keep a cap on the growth of a domestic capitalist class in the long term, nor,
however, will it necessarily want to. Aggregate economic growth, job creation, and elevated standards of living generated by domestic entrepreneurial activity aren’t awful
things. The concern may be more a question of extent and pace. The pace needs to

be calibrated by the development of Cuban
institutions able to e↵ectively check the inequitable logic of capitalism and harness its
growth capacity for the public good. If this
is true, it is likely that the PCC will look to
suppress the growth of a domestic capitalist class for enough time to allow current
reforms to the legislative decision making
process to anchor their roots and begin to
work systematically.
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